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1 Introduction
Environmental protection is a priority and a challenge in many countries. Economic
activity generates negative external effects that producers do not internalize. Taxes and
standards are the common policy instruments to regulate the environmental quality. The
traditional approach to discuss the optimal environmental policy has been to assume that
polluters comply with the environmental regulation. However, firms’ compliance is not
guarantied. To be fully effective, information on the firms’ characteristics and behavior
is necessary for the implementation of taxes and standards.
The aim of this paper is to study the optimal audit policy in a situation where firms
may evade environmental taxes. We analyze the effects of the possibility of evasion (com-
bined with the optimal auditing policy) on the level of environmental emissions of a
population of firms. We also study how the optimal policy varies with the characteristics
of the firms.1
We follow some recent environmental policy literature that has incorporated compli-
ance issues.2 We assume that the tax policy is not perfectly enforceable; in particular
we consider that environmental taxes may be evaded by under-reporting emissions. This
becomes possible when government monitoring is imperfect because firms cannot be mon-
itored with high probability (it is costly), or because even when monitored, the true level
of emissions of a firm is difficult to identify. Inspection policies combined with sanctions
provide a key tool on the provision of incentives to reduce environmental deviations.
Cropper & Oates (1992) define two types of environmental problems that may give
raise to different environmental violations. First, pollution may be the issue of an accident:
be a negligence or a random act of nature. This type of problem is not considered in our
paper. Second, a firmmay intentionally violate the law by not complying with a regulatory
standard, or by not paying the appropriate emission taxes. That is the type of violation
that we analyze in this paper. In addition, we make an important distinction between the
1We concentrate in emission taxes because they have the virtue that, face to the same emission tax,
marginal emission benefits (or marginal abatement costs) are equal across firms.
2The compliance issue based on monitoring (or inspections) and fines is of general interest in many
fields. For a general review of the compliance literature see Polinsky & Shavell (2000). For environmental
problems see Cohen (1999).
2
emission level and the taxes paid by a firm. Firms explicitly choose an emission - report
combination and they may comply better or worse with the environmental target than
with the tax obligation.
We first analyze the impact of the audit policy on an individual firm. The audit
policy has a deterrence effect on both the firm’s actual level of emission and its reported
emission. When the firm does not fear any inspection, then it pollutes freely, while it also
reports not to have polluted at all. When faced with a positive (but small) audit pressure,
the firm decreases its emission level, and continues to report not to have polluted. It is
only when the audit pressure is strong that the firm begins reporting more truthfully its
actual level of emission. Hence, initially, auditing has much a stronger deterrence effect
on the emission decisions than on the reporting of them. We claim this characteristic
of the firm’s behavior facing audits is good news. In particular, it has been extensively
argued that pollution taxes should be considered for their environmental effects not for
their revenue potential.
Second, we consider the optimal policy when the enforcement agency faces a popula-
tion of firms with different characteristics. We develop the analysis under the assumption
that the only objective of the enforcement agency is to minimize the level of emissions,
as rising revenue is not an issue for the agency. We show that when firms differ in the
effectiveness of the audit (some are more difficult to detect than others), then it is optimal
to go first after the firms easy to audit. As the budget for audit increases, more firms
will be monitored, while the audit intensity on inspected firms increases. We also analyze
the case where firms differ in the private gains from emissions. In this case, the optimal
enforcement policy biases its strength against those firms that value pollution less.
We show that, as it is expected, an increase in the budget (more monitoring) will
induce pollution to fall. However, unless the enforcement agency’s budget is very large,
it will allocate its auditing effort among the firms in such a way that all of them will
report not to have polluted. That is, an increase in the budget will not induce a raise
in compliance with environmental taxes. We want to highlight the importance of this
distinction: There are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective,
and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.
Our result seems to be at odds with a well-established result by Harford (1978). This
3
author concludes that “the actual waste level of the firm does not directly depend upon
the size of the fine or the probability of discovery of the violation.” That is, increases
in the budget would lead to more compliance with the taxes, but not to lower emission
levels. This result was obtained from the analysis of the interior solution of the compliance
decision of a single firm. Harford (1978) also studied the corner solutions and argued that
the interior solution is the sensible one. Our analysis points out that when the enforcement
agency decides upon the distribution of the auditing intensity in a population of firms, it
often allocates its limited resources in a manner where firms do not behave as described
by Harford (1978).3
There is increasing literature on environmental regulations and more recently on the
enforcement issue.4 Harford (1987), Kaplow & Shavell (1994), and Innes (1999), among
others, have also considered self-reporting as an important element in enforcement policies.
They show that self-reporting combined with an audit strategy increases compliance.
Swierzbinski (1994) and Bontems & Bourgeon (2001) study an informational aspect
complementary to the one we address in this paper. They consider a model of envi-
ronmental taxes where the regulator that designs the environmental policy may observe
the emission levels (through a costly audit), but does not know the firms’ abatement
costs. They show that the threat of monitoring alters the usual result stating that firms
over-estimate their abatement costs.
Finally, some empirical papers (see for example Dasgupta et al., 2001, and Foulon
et al., 2002) document the effect of monitoring and enforcement actions on the level of
pollution emissions (for a review, see Cohen, 2000). They provide evidence on the fact
that both inspection and threat of an inspection are useful to reduce pollution emission .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and the firm’s
decision on both the emission level and the payment of taxes. Section 3 analyzes the
optimal policy when there is a population of heterogenous firms that differ in their oppor-
tunities to evade; while in Section 4, we consider that firms differ in the gains of pollution.
3The model used by Harford (1978) has some differences with the model we present. However, the
argument we give in this paragraph is robust to changes in our model to make it similar to the one by
Harford (1978).
4Cropper & Oates (1992), Cohen (1999), and Sandmo (2000) provide extensive reviews of the litera-
ture.
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In Sector 5, we discuss on the generality of the results, and Section 6 concludes. Finally,
an Appendix includes all the proofs.
2 The Model and the Firm’s decision
In this section, we present the basic model and consider the decision of a single competitive
firm. For the purpose of our model, we concentrate on the decision of the firm concerning
its true and reported level of emission. We use a generalization of the framework used for
example by Sandmo (2002).
The firm chooses the level of emission e, where e ∈ [0, E]. Hence, E is the emission level
of the firm when pollution is free. The firm’s benefits from emission e are represented by
the function λg(e), with λ > 0, and g(.) increasing and concave: g0(e) > 0 and g00(e) ≤ 0.
Also, we assume for simplicity that g0(0) = +∞ and g0(E) = 0, so that a small level of
emission has a big marginal impact on the firm’s profits, while the marginal profits at very
high emission levels are very small. Parameter λ introduces a simple way to parametrize
the gains of the firm (usually due to cost reduction) when polluting. A firm with higher
λ is a firm whose private benefits from polluting are higher.
In order to control pollution, emissions are taxed at rate t > 0. We consider that t is
exogenously given; it is set by the government. It may be equal to the marginal social
damages of emissions evaluated at the social optimum, taking into account the problem
of enforcement.
Under environmental taxes, the profits of a firm with parameter λ that produces a
level of emissions e and pays the taxes corresponding to e (i.e., there is perfect monitoring
of emissions) are:
Π(λ; e) = λg(e)− te.
We denote by e∗λ = e
∗(λ) the optimal level of emissions under perfect monitoring for a
firm with parameter λ. The level e∗λ is characterized by:
λg0(e∗λ) = t.
The optimal level of emissions under perfect enforceability e∗λ is increasing in λ and de-
creasing in t.
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If the level of emissions is not perfectly monitorable cost free, then the auditing strat-
egy of the enforcement agency and the reporting strategy of the firm (in addition to its
emission strategy) are strategic decisions. We denote by α the probability that the en-
forcement agency will audit the emissions of the firm.5 However, α is not necessarily the
probability that an evasion is caught, since an audit does not always allow to uncover
the firm’s true level of emissions. The probability that the true emission level of the
firm is identified through an audit is ρ ∈ [0, 1] . Parameter ρ may be understood as the
difficulty to detect a violation or to have strong evidence that allows to sanction the firm.
Some pollutants persist in the environment longer than others; some can be more exactly
assigned to the activity of a particular firm than others. The parameter ρ reflects these
differences. A firm with a lower ρ is a firm that has more room for evading, since its
emissions are harder to identify when audited.
The firm may choose a report z that does not coincide with the true emission level
e. A firm never reports a higher emission level than the real one (since it involves paying
higher taxes), so z ≤ e. When it reports a level of emission inferior to the real one -if it
is audited and its true emission level is identified-, then in addition to paying the evaded
taxes, a penalty is imposed to the firm. This penalty takes the form of the function
θ(e− z), increasing and convex in the level of evasion: θ(0) = 0, θ0(x) > 0 and θ00(x) > 0
for x > 0.6
Therefore, the expected profits of a firm with parameters (λ, ρ) facing an audit prob-
5By now, we consider that the probability of being audited is independent of the report made by
the firm. We think this is a sensible hypothesis. Moreover, in Section 5, we will show that restricting
attention to this class of policy is without loss of generality in many scenarios.
6The penalty may be monetary or not. For example, in Canada, a list of firms that either do not comply
with the existing regulation or whose environmental performance is of concern, is anually published.
Both the community and the market act on it (see e.g., Lanoi et al. 1998, for evidence on this aspect).
Community pressure and other forms of informal sanction have been explored, for example, by Brooks
& Sethi (1997). Penalties may also include the costs for cleaning-up violations of the environmental
regulation that responsible firms must pay.
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ability α, when it chooses an emission level e, and it reports z, can be written as:7
EΠ (λ, ρ, α; e, z) = λg(e)− tz − ραt[e− z]− ραθ(e− z) for z ≤ e. (1)
The firm chooses the optimal levels eo and zo in order to maximize the expected profits
(1). If the solution is interior, the first-order conditions are:
∂EΠ
∂e
= λg0(e)− ραt− ραθ0(e− z) = 0, (2)
∂EΠ
∂z
= −t+ ραt+ ραθ0(e− z) = 0. (3)
The next proposition establishes the optimal behavior of the firm:
Proposition 1 For a given tax rate t, audit probability α, and penalty function θ(.), the
optimal emission and report decisions (eo, zo) for the firm with parameters (λ, ρ) are:
(a) If ρα = 0, then eo = E and zo = 0.
(b) If ρα ∈
³
0, tθ0(e∗λ)+t
´
, then eo ∈ (e∗λ, E) as defined by (4) and zo = 0, with
λg0(eo)− ραt− ραθ0(eo) = 0. (4)
(c) If ρα ∈
h
t
θ0(e∗λ)+t
, tθ0(0)+t
´
, then eo = e∗λ and z
o ∈ (0, e∗λ) as defined by (5) :
[1− ρα]t = ραθ0(e∗λ − zo). (5)
(d) If ρα ≥ tθ0(0)+t , then eo = e∗λ and zo = e∗λ.
The solution in terms of emissions and reports as a function of the audit probability α
(for a firm that is caught with probability ρ) is illustrated in Figure 1.8 Since α ∈ [0, 1],
it may be the case that Region (d) in Figure 1, does not exist. This happens when
t/ρ [θ0(0) + t] ≥ 1, for example because θ0(0) = 0, or ρ and/or θ0(0) are low enough. It
can also be the case that both Regions (c) and (d) do not exist, what happens when
t/ρ [θ0(e∗λ) + t] ≥ 1, i.e., ρ is very low. Note, also, that the limits of the regions separating
7To help the reading of equations, throughout the paper we only use parenthesis (.) for functions, as
in θ(e− z) while we use brackets [.] for multiplications, as in t[e− z], which means t times e− z.
8Note that a similar figure can be drawn as a function of ρ for any level of α. It suffices to take into
account that, for example the cut-off α = t/ρ
£
θ0(0) + t
¤
will become ρ = t/α
£
θ0(0) + t
¤
.
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the interior and the corner solutions do not depend on g(.), but they depend on λ via e∗λ.
Finally, if the penalty function would be linear, then θ0(0) = θ0(e∗λ), and Region (c) would
vanish.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
If the firm is not subject to any audit (α = 0), or it is impossible for the agency to
prove that it has polluted (ρ = 0), then the firm does not fear an inspection. Hence,
it pollutes freely while claiming to be a clean firm, that is, eo = E and zo = 0. As the
pressure on the firm increases (i.e., as we go from Region (a) to (b), with ρα increasing),
the firm decreases its level of emissions, while still reporting that it is clean. This is an
important insight from the analysis of the model: when auditing is not too frequent, it
has much a stronger deterrence effect on the emissions than on the report. This result
is independent of the objective function of the environmental agency, since it is derived
from the analysis of the behavior of the firm. However, it is particularly good news for
an agency that is (as we will assume from the next section on) mainly concerned about
emissions, rather than with catching under-reporting firms.
When the audit pressure is strong, the firm chooses the “minimum” level of emission
e∗λ (the level that the firm would choose under perfect monitoring) and also makes a more
honest report. This corresponds to Region (c), where there is an interior solution for both
emissions and report. This is the case that leads Harford (1978) to reach the conclusion
that emissions are not affected by the probability of auditing.9 This is a very well-known
result in the literature cited, for example, in Cohen (2000). Region (c) is also the region
analyzed in Sandmo (2002), where the optimal emission level is obtained, even if the taxes
collected are not the ones corresponding to that emission level. Finally, if the perceived
audit pressure ρα is even stronger (Region (d)), the firm’s decision is the same as under
prefect monitoring, that is, eo = zo = e∗λ.
Auditing firms aims at two apparently offsetting effects: (ex-ante) deterrence and (ex-
post) detection. Some stylized facts10 suggest that increased monitoring (a higher α)
leads to higher detection coupled with higher deterrence. That is, the detection effect
9Harford (1978) also analyzes case (b) where reported wasted are equal to zero. He disregards this
case as: “It would be irrational to set penalties so low that no pollution tax at all was collected.”
10See for example Epple & Visscher (1984) and Cohen (2000).
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outweighs any deterrent effect. Our result is compatible with these stylized facts. Indeed,
in the (possibly most relevant) Region (b), increasing α makes the firm more compliant,
since it decreases its emission level. Moreover, the probability of the firm being caught
increases, since it is still underreporting.
Finally, we state (without its easy proof) a corollary with the comparative statics of
the optimal firm’s emission, and report with respect to the different parameters.
Corollary 1 (i) The optimal firm’s emissions eo are increasing in λ and decreasing in t
when ρα > 0. Moreover, eo is non-increasing in α and ρ.
(ii) The optimal firm’s report zo is non-decreasing in α, ρ, and λ and non-increasing
in t.
3 Firms differ in their possibilities to evade
In this section, we consider the optimal monitoring policy for the enforcement agency
when it is in charge of auditing a population of firms that are heterogeneous with respect
to their opportunities to evade. That is, we assume here that all firms obtain the same
benefits from polluting, and we normalize λ = 1, but the probability of uncovering evasion
varies across them, that is firms differ in their parameter ρ. The population of firms,
parametrized by ρ, is distributed over the interval [0, 1] , according to the density function
f(ρ), with f(ρ) > 0, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1], whose cumulative function is F (ρ). The enforcement
agency has complete information about the type of each firm and can design an audit
policy that discriminates among them.
We assume that the only objective of the enforcement agency is to minimize total
emissions. That is, following e.g. Garvie & Keeler (1994), we assume that the enforcement
agency does not intend to raise money. Its objective is to achieve the highest level of
compliance given its enforcement budget. (A lump-sum tax on firms allows to raise
money without inducing any distortion.)11 We denote by B the budget that the agency
can devote to auditing and we normalize the cost of one audit to one, so that B is the
11It has often been argued that environmental quality should be the ultimate goal of enforcement
agencies (see, for example, OECD, 2001). In addition, penalties are often not monetary, as discussed in
the previous section.
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number of audits that the agency can carry out. Hence, the enforcement agency decides
on the probability of auditing each type of firm, that is, it chooses (α(ρ))ρ∈[0,1] in order
to solve the following program:
Min
Z 1
0
e(ρ)f(ρ)dρ
s.t.
Z 1
0
α(ρ)f(ρ)dρ ≤ B
e(ρ) ∈ argmax EΠ(ρ, α(ρ); e, z),
where EΠ(ρ, α; e, z) are the expected profits defined in (1) for λ = 1.
As we have seen after Proposition 1, the minimum emission level that the agency can
achieve from any firm is e∗ (we denote e∗ ≡ e∗1 since λ = 1 in all this section). Let us
define
αˆ(ρ) ≡ t
ρ [θ0(e∗) + t]
as the minimum audit probability that induces a level of emissions e∗ from a firm of type
ρ (when α ≤ αˆ(ρ), the firm reports z = 0, the report is positive for α > αˆ(ρ)). Note that
this probability level is “feasible” only when αˆ(ρ) ≤ 1, i.e., ρ ≥ bρ, where:
bρ ≡ t
θ0(e∗) + t
.
A firm whose parameter ρ is lower than bρ, pollutes more than e∗, even if the audit
probability is α = 1, since the probability of being discovered when audited is low.
The minimum total pollution level that the agency can achieve (even with an unlimited
budget) is:
eMINρ ≡
Z bρ
0
e∗∗ (ρ) f(ρ)dρ+ [1− F (bρ)] e∗,
where e∗∗ (ρ) is implicitly defined by:
g0(e∗∗ (ρ))− ρt− ρθ0(e∗∗ (ρ)) = 0 for ρ ∈ (0,bρ] ,
and e∗∗(0) = E. The first term in the expression for eMINρ measures the emissions of the
firms that over-pollute even when audited with probability one, choosing e∗∗ (ρ) > e∗.
The second term adds up the pollution of the firms that may be induced to choose the
level of emission e∗.
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What is the minimum budget that the enforcement agency needs in order to achieve
eMINρ ? The firms whose ρ belongs to [0,bρ], should be audited with probability α (ρ) = 1.
On the other hand, those firms whose ρ belongs to (bρ, 1], only need to be audited with
probability αˆ(ρ). Therefore, the budget necessary to achieve eMINρ is:
Bρ ≡ F (bρ) + Z 1bρ αˆ(ρ)f (ρ) dρ.
Given that the objective of the enforcement agency is to minimize emissions, the next
proposition formally states an immediate consequence of the previous analysis.
Proposition 2 When B ≥ Bρ, the agency sets an audit policy involving α (ρ) = 1, for
ρ ∈ [0,bρ] , and α (ρ) ∈ [αˆ(ρ), 1] , for ρ ∈ (bρ, 1].
When the budget allocated to the enforcement agency is large enough, it will set a
policy to achieve the minimum total pollution level possible, eMINρ . Increases in α (ρ) , with
respect to αˆ(ρ), for ρ > bρ, do not affect the firms’ level of emission, they only increase
the firms’ report.
In the remainder of this section, we consider situations where B < Bρ, that is, where
the agency does not have resources to achieve eMINρ . In this case, the agency never sets
an auditing probability higher than αˆ(ρ) for a type-ρ firm. Indeed, if it is the case that
α (ρ) > αˆ(ρ) for some ρ, decreasing this probability and increasing the audit pressure
over those firms ρ0 for which α (ρ0) < αˆ(ρ0), would lead to a reduction in the total level of
emissions. This fact leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 If B < Bρ, then the firm’s report will be z(ρ) = 0, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1] , when
the enforcement agency implements the optimal auditing policy.
Proposition 3 states a result that is quite surprising at first sight: unless the agency’s
budget is very large (larger that Bρ), all the firms in the economy will be reporting that
they do not pollute. Understanding the result requires going back to Proposition 1. That
proposition stated that increasing monitoring makes a firm first (region (b)) decrease its
emissions until a minimum level e∗λ, while keeping the report z
o = 0. When the monitoring
is strong enough so that the firm decides e∗λ (region (c)), then increasing pressure only
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affects its reporting level, making it closer to the true emission. When the auditing agency
only cares about emissions, the effect on the report is unimportant. Hence, it is not until
all the firms are lead to their minimum level of emissions (and this requires a budget of
at least Bρ), that the agency induces them to report more truthfully.
Before analyzing how the agency allocates the budget among the different types of
firms, we comment on the allocation of resources to firms that have equal opportunities
to evade. It is intuitive that the agency “should” apply the same policy to two identical
firms. This is certainly the case if the optimal firm’s emission is a (decreasing and) convex
function of the probability of auditing. Indeed, under convexity, auditing one firm with a
higher probability than other identical firms does not minimize the emission: monitoring
both firms with average probability would decrease total pollution. The next assumption
guaranties that the emissions are in fact a convex function of the auditing probability.
Assumption 1 The function h(x) defined below is increasing:
h(x) ≡ t+ θ
0(e(x))
g00(e(x))− xθ00(e(x)) . (6)
Note that g000(.) > Max{0, θ000(.)} is a sufficient (although far from necessary) condition
for h(x) to be increasing.
The next proposition characterizes the optimal auditing policy for budgets lower than
Bρ, under Assumption 1. In particular, it shows that the auditing strategy will be bi-
ased to target the easier-to-audit firms - the ones whose emissions are easier to identify.
Corollary 2 complements the proposition stating the firms’ behavior facing the optimal
auditing policy.
Proposition 4 When B < Bρ, under Assumption 1, there exist ρa (B) and ρb (B) , with
0 < ρa (B) < ρb (B) ≤ 1, such that the optimal audit policy α(ρ) satisfies the following:
(I) If ρ ≤ ρa (B) , then α(ρ) = 0,
(II) if ρ ∈ (ρa (B) , ρb (B)) , then α(ρ) ∈ (0, αˆ(ρ)) , with ρα(ρ) increasing in ρ, and
(III) if ρ ≥ ρb (B) , then α(ρ) = αˆ(ρ).
Corollary 2 When B < Bρ, under Assumption 1, the optimal firms’ emission level eo(ρ)
facing the optimal policy is the following:
(I) If ρ ≤ ρa (B) , then e(ρ) = E,
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(II) if ρ ∈ (ρa (B) , ρb (B)) , then eo(ρ) (defined by (2) for z = 0 and α = α(ρ)) is decreasing
in ρ, and
(III) if ρ ≥ ρb (B) , then eo(ρ) = e∗.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 4 and Corollary 2. When the enforcement agency does
not have the budget necessary to achieve the minimum pollution possible eMINρ , then it
has incentives to discriminate among firms. The agency first targets those firms whose
non-compliance is easier to verify, that is, firms with higher ρ. For the firms with the
highest ρs, that is, in Region (III) (which only exists when the budget B is high enough),
the agency exerts the maximum auditing pressure, leading those firms to their lowest level
of emissions e∗. In this region, the audit pressure α(ρ) decreases with ρ, because the easier
it is to identify pollution, the lower the audit probability necessary to induce e∗.
The agency also audits with some probability those firms with intermediate values of
the parameter ρ, Region (II), the total perceived pressure ρα(ρ) increasing in ρ. Hence,
easier-to-catch firms produce lower levels of emissions. Finally, the agency decides not to
audit those firms whose pollution is very difficult to detect. All these firms will pollute
as much as they want, that is eo(ρ) = E.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
It is worthwhile pointing out that a similar result to Proposition 4 holds if the objective
function of the enforcement agency is to minimize the budget necessary to achieve a given
level of total emissions. For any level of total emissions e¯ that the agency would wish to
implement, there exist two cut-off values, ρa (e¯) and ρb (e¯) , that define three Regions (I),
(II) and (III) where the optimal audit policy follows the same pattern as in Proposition
4.
Let us concentrate now on how the audit strategy changes with the budget.
Proposition 5 The cut-off levels ρa (B) and ρb (B) , identified in Proposition 4, satisfy
the following property: ρa (B) is decreasing and ρb (B) is non-increasing in B. Moreover,
the optimal audit pressure α(ρ) is increasing in B, for all ρ ∈ (ρa (B) , ρb (B)).
Proposition 5 shows that when the budget for audit increases, more firms (from the
population of firms easy to monitor) will comply with the environmental standards, and
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some more other firms hard to monitor will be subject to audit. Moreover, except for
the firms whose audit pressure is either zero, or high enough, the audit intensity will also
increase with the budget (and hence the emission level will decrease).
4 Firms differ in their gains of pollution
In this section, we characterize the optimal monitoring policy when firms differ in the
gains from emissions. Given the similarities between this analysis and the one developed
in the previous section, we concentrate here on the main result and intuitions.
We consider that the enforcement agency faces a population of firms parametrized
by λ (the parameter that measures the gains of the firms), distributed over the interval£
λ, λ
¤
, 0 < λ < λ according to the density function ϕ(λ), with ϕ(λ) > 0 for all λ ∈
£
λ, λ
¤
.
We consider for simplicity that the monitoring technology is perfect, i.e., ρ = 1, the
qualitative results are not altered if one analyzes the situations with ρ < 1.
In Section 2, we have denoted e∗λ the emission level decided by a firm with parameter
λ which is subject to perfect monitoring. This is the minimum emission level that the
enforcement agency can achieve through its monitoring strategy. Moreover, when ρ = 1,
the firm will indeed pollute e∗λ if and only if the probability of auditing is higher or equal
to tθ0(e∗λ)+t
, which is always smaller than 1. Hence, the minimum industry pollution level,
with no constraint on the budget, is defined by:
eMINλ ≡
Z λ
λ
e∗λϕ(λ)dλ.
The budget necessary to achieve eMINλ is:
Bλ ≡
Z λ
λ
t
[θ0(e∗λ) + t]
ϕ (λ) dλ.
The next proposition characterizes the optimal monitoring policy:
Proposition 6 (i) When B ≥ Bλ, the agency sets an audit policy involving α (λ) ≥
t
[θ0(e∗λ)+t]
, for all λ ∈
£
λ, λ
¤
. Firms’ emission levels are eo(λ) = e∗λ.
(ii) When B < Bλ, there exist λ (B) , with λ < λ (B) ≤ λ, such that
(ii.I) For firms with λ ≥ λ (B) , then α(λ) = 0. Firms’ emission levels are eo(λ) = E.
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(ii.II) For firms with λ < λ (B) , then α(λ) > 0. Firms’ emission levels eo(λ) are
increasing in λ.
Proposition 6 shows that when the firms differ in the gains from emissions, the agency
biases its strategy against those firms that value pollution less. Having less incentives to
pollute, the firms with less gains from polluting will be more deterred by the auditing,
hence the monitoring will have a stronger effect on those firms. On the other hand,
the agency prefers not to devote resources to firms that place strong value on emissions
(i.e., firms with very high λ). For those firms, polluting is so valuable that the marginal
deterrence effect of the audit is small.
5 A general audit policy
We have considered a model where the probability α that a firm is audited of independent
on the report. We made this reasonable hypothesis because it simplifies the analysis. In
general, however, the audit probability can depend not only on the firm’s characteristics
(ρ and λ), but also on the firm’s behavior (the report z). We prove, and briefly discuss
here, a result that shows that restricting attention to policies independent of the report
z is without loss of generality in many interesting cases.
We denote
αˆ(ρ, λ) ≡ t
ρ [θ0(e∗λ) + t]
the minimum audit probability that induces e∗λ from a firm with parameters (λ, ρ).
Proposition 7 Consider a general auditing function α(z), and let zo be the optimal firm’s
report given α(z). Suppose that α(zo) ≤ αˆ(ρ, λ). Then, the audit policy where the agency
audits any report with probability α(zo) is equivalent to the policy α(z).
Proposition 7 shows that, if the agency does not want to achieve emission levels below
e∗λ, then it can restrict attention to policies where the audit probability does not depend
on the report. The agency cannot achieve a better result through more general audit
policies. Note that, if the tax rate t is optimally designed, e∗λ is the optimal emission level
from a social point of view. On the other hand, if the tax rate is not optimal, and the
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agency can credibly use sophisticated auditing schemes with audit probabilities depending
on the firm’s report, then it may have incentives to propose different audit functions than
the ones we use.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have aimed at better understanding the role of environmental monitoring
on firms’ emission decisions and firms’ tax compliance behavior. Our results predict that,
when facing a population of heterogenous firms, the enforcement agency will focus on the
“easier” enforcement targets: easier-to-detect firms and those firms that value pollution
less. Hence, the results allow to explain why some firms and/or some industries are more
monitored than others. This conclusion is in accordance with stylized facts. Moreover,
we have also shown that the optimal auditing policy may very well lead to a reasonable
level of emission, coupled with a very high level of environmental tax evasion.
In our model, we abstract from many interesting elements of the environmental en-
forcement problem that are complementary to our analysis. Let us briefly comment on
some of them.
We concentrate on the enforcement aspect of the environmental problem, and we do
not address the question on how environmental taxes and the enforcement agency’s budget
are decided. These tools may be the choice of the central authority, who may consider
social welfare or political interest in the decision-making process. In our model, the
enforcement agency maximizes compliance with the environmental target. The general
environmental policy will be decided at an earlier stage.
We assume that sanctions are costless to the enforcement agency. In fact, one may
argue that prosecuting and enforcing the payment of fines may be costly for the regulator.
This aspect may reduce the agency interest in enforcing the environmental target, but
will not change the nature of our results. We also assume that all the participants are
risk-neutral. Risk aversion, or wealth constraints, may be important in some cases. In
particular, bankruptcy and insolvency are problems that should be taken into account.
However, we have argued that penalties are often non monetary (incarceration, reputation,
firm’s image, etc.).
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In our model, the probability of inspection is endogenous (and contingent to the firm’s
wastes report). However, we do not consider the possibility that the probability of being
inspected increases with the level of emissions of a firm. It may be the case that the
firm’s emission level may attract the attention of the environment agency via some kind
of signal so that the probability of being audited increases with the level of evasion. Prior
information in environmental enforcement has been considered by several authors. Har-
ford (1978) assumes that the exogenous probability of auditing is an increasing function
of the wastes emissions. Heyes (2002) presents a model where the firm is subject to a
“light” inspection that may trigger a real audit. Francks (2002) proposes to use ambient
inspections before deciding on the auditing of a particular firm (see also Macho-Stadler
and Pérez-Castrillo, 2002, for an analysis of the use of prior information in tax evasion
models).
Finally, we have adopted the principal - agent approach. Hence, we have assumed
perfect commitment (that often is justified based on the reputation concern of the en-
forcement agency). This is the most common approach. In fact, this is the most optimistic
one, since it is the best scenario for enforcement issues. Some authors have recently con-
sidered the enforcement problem (monitoring and emission strategies) as the sequential
equilibrium outcome of a game, where the enforcement agency has no-commmitment ca-
pacity (see for instance Franckx, 2002).
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we check the second-order conditions:
∂2EΠ
∂e2
= λg00(e)− ραθ00(e− z) < 0,
∂2EΠ
∂z2
= −ραθ00(e− z) < 0, and
∂2EΠ
∂e2
∂2EΠ
∂z2
−
·
∂2EΠ
∂e∂z
¸2
= −ραλg00(e)θ00(e− z) ≥ 0.
The emission level eo maximizing (1) is always strictly positive. Also, it is strictly
lower than the maximum level E if and only if ρα > 0. If ρα = 0, that is, we are in region
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(a), then it is easy to check that the firm chooses eo = E and zo = 0. For the rest of the
proof, we consider ρα > 0, hence e ∈ (0, E).
The report z is interior if and only if ραθ0(0) < [1− ρα]t < ραθ0(eo). When ραθ0(0) ≥
[1 − ρα]t, that is, we are in region (d), the corner solution is zo = eo (the firm reports
honestly) and then equation (2) gives eo = e∗λ.When [1−ρα]t ≥ ραθ0(eo), the firm reports
zo = 0. It chooses eo satisfying (2) for zo = 0, i.e. eo satisfies (4). Such a pair, eo satisfying
(4) and zo = 0, is indeed a candidate solution if and only if [1− ρα]t ≥ ραθ0(eo) for the
proposed eo. Given (4), the previous inequality is equivalent to t ≥ λg0(eo), i.e., eo ≥ e∗λ.
This corresponds to the candidate (that will be optimum) in region (b) (the case eo = e∗λ
also appears when we analyze interior solutions). When both the emission level and the
report are interior (region (c)), adding equations (2) and (3) we obtain λg0(e) = t, i.e.,
eo = e∗λ. The optimal report in this region z
o is defined by (3) for e = e∗λ, that is, it is
given by equation (5).
Proof of Proposition 4. We start the proof by stating and proving two lemmas.
Lemma 1. The enforcement agency audits two firms with the same probability.
Proof Lemma 1. Denote α1 and α2 the probabilities of auditing identical firms 1
and 2 with equal parameter ρ. First, when min{α1,α2}≥ αˆ(ρ), the enforcement agency
achieves the best possible outcome, since e1 = e2 = e∗. No reallocation of resources
among those firms are possible. But since B < Bρ, no probability can be higher than
αˆ(ρ), hence α1 = α2 = αˆ(ρ). Second, in region (b) of Proposition 1, where α < αˆ(ρ) and
eo < e∗, it is easy to check that the first derivative of eo with respect to α is ρh(ρα).
Therefore, eo is a convex function of α since h(x) is increasing. Auditing one firm with
a probability α1 lower than α2 does not minimize the emission: a monitoring probability
equal to (α1 + α2)/2 applied to both firms would result in lower total emissions e1 + e2.
Lemma 2. The emission levels e1 and e2 of two firms with parameters ρ1 and ρ2
satisfy e1 ≥ e2 if and only if ρ1α1 ≤ ρ2α2. Also, e1 > e2 if and only if ρ1α1 < ρ2α2 and
α1 < αˆ(ρ1).
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose ρ1α1 ≤ ρ2α2. First, if α1 ≥ αˆ(ρ1), i.e., ρ1α1 ≥ bρ, then
also ρ2α2 ≥ bρ, i.e., α2 ≥ αˆ(ρ2). Therefore, e1 = e2 = e∗. Second, if ρ1α1 < bρ ≤ ρ2α2,
then e2 = e∗ < e1. Third, let us assume that ρ2α2 < bρ. Take equation (2) for zo = 0
(since in this region z1 = z2 = 0): λg0(e) = ρα [t+ θ0(e)] . This equation defines a negative
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relationship between e and ρα since g(.) is concave and θ(.) is convex. Finally, it is easy
to check that the conditions are not only necessary, but also sufficient.
To complete the proof of Proposition 4, let us consider two firms, 1 and 2, such that
ρ1 < ρ2. Denoting αi = α(ρi) and ei = e
o(ρi), for i = 1, 2, we prove that ρ1α1 ≤ ρ2α2.
In the following argument, we assume α1 ∈ (0, αˆ(ρ1)], α2 < αˆ(ρ2) (and also α2 < 1).
Suppose by contradiction that ρ1α1 > ρ2α2 and consider a decrease in α1 by δ > 0 (δ
small enough) that induces a saving of f(ρ1)δ in auditing costs, and an increase in α2,
financed through this saving. This implies an increase in α2 equal to
f(ρ1)
f(ρ2)
δ. The change
in the total level of emissions after this reallocation of budget is (notice that the marginal
effects take place in region (b) of Proposition 1):
−f(ρ1)
∂e1
∂α1
δ + f(ρ2)
∂e2
∂α2
f(ρ1)
f(ρ2)
δ = f(ρ1)δ [−ρ1h(ρ1α1) + ρ2h(ρ2α2)] .
Since h(x) is increasing, h(ρ1α1) > h(ρ2α2), both expressions being negative. Therefore,
[−ρ1h(ρ1α1) + ρ2h(ρ2α2)] < 0 and total emissions decrease after the reallocation of the
budget previously proposed. Therefore, setting α1 and α2 such that ρ1α1 > ρ2α2 cannot
be optimal.
(a) By the previous argument α1 = 0 when α2 = 0. Hence, there exists ρa (B) such that
α(ρ) = 0 for all ρ < ρa (B) . To show that ρa (B) > 0, note that the marginal effect
on eo(0) of a decrease in α(0) is zero, while the marginal effect of an increase in α(ρ) is
positive, for every ρ > 0 for which α(ρ) < αˆ(ρ) (which always exists because B < Bρ).
(b) It is immediate after the argument developed before.
(c) The previous argument also implies that α2 = αˆ(ρ2) whenever α1 < αˆ(ρ1). Notice
in addition that when B is large enough (but still smaller than Bρ), there exists a value
ρb (B) < 1 that does separate regions (b) and (c). The reason is that the following limit:
lim
α→αˆ(ρ)
∂eo
∂α
= ρ
t+ θ0(e∗))
g00(e∗)− ραˆ(ρ)θ00(e∗)) =
1
ρg00(e∗) [t+ θ0(e∗))]− tθ00(e∗))
is decreasing in ρ. Hence, as ρ increases, the marginal effect of an increase in α as it
approaches αˆ(ρ) is more negative.
Proof of Proposition 5. We first notice, after Proposition 4, that the optimal
audit policy for a particular B is easily characterized once we know α(ρo) for any ρo for
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which 0 < α(ρo) < αˆ(ρo). Indeed, let bx(ρ) be implicitly defined by:
h(bx(ρ)) = ρoh (ρoα(ρo))
ρ
and bx(ρ) = 0 if h(0) ≥ ρoh (ρoα(ρo))
ρ
.
The value bx(ρ) is well defined because h() is an increasing function. Take x(ρ) =
Min {bx(ρ), ραˆ(ρ)} . Then, it is easy to check that the optimal policy is α (ρ) = x(ρ)/ρ.
The function bx(ρ) is weakly increasing in α(ρo) (it is strictly increasing if bx(ρ) > 0).
Hence, α(ρ) is weakly increasing in α(ρo). In other words, when a particular ρ = ρo is
audited more regularly, no other ρ can be audited with less probability. Consequently,
the level of emissions e(ρ) is also a weakly increasing function in e(α(ρo)). A higher B
must imply the increase in the audit probability of at least one type-ρ firm, and by the
previous argument no firm may be now under a lower audit pressure. Hence, a higher B
leads to a lower ρa and ρb. Moreover, the audit intensity increases for all firms that are
not at a corner solution.
Proof of Proposition 6. Part (i) is trivial since B ≥ Bλ allows to set a policy
involving α (λ) ≥ t
[θ0(e∗λ)+t]
for all λ ∈
£
λ, λ
¤
, which leads to the best possible outcome for
the agency.
For part (ii), we first claim that, by the same reasons as in Proposition 3, when
B < Bλ the auditing policy is such that α (λ) ≤ t[θ0(e∗λ)+t]
and it induces all firms to report
zero. That is, the policy lies in regions (a) or (b) of Proposition 1. Second, consider two
firms, with λ1 > λ2, α(λ1) > 0, and α(λ2) < t[θ0(e∗λ2 )+t]
. We analyze the consequences of a
decrease in α(λ1) by δ > 0 (δ small enough) that induces a saving of ϕ(λ1)δ in auditing
costs, and an increase in α(λ2) financed with this amount. This implies an increase in
α(λ2) equal to
ϕ(λ1)
ϕ(λ2)δ. The change in the total level of emissions after this reallocation of
budget is (note that the relevant marginal effects happen in region (b) of Proposition 1):
−ϕ(λ1)
∂eo(λ1)
∂α(λ1)
δ + ϕ(λ2)
∂eo(λ2)
∂α(λ2)
ϕ(λ1)
ϕ(λ2)
δ = ϕ(λ1)δ
·
− 1
λ1
h
µ
α(λ1)
λ1
¶
+
1
λ2
h
µ
α(λ2)
λ2
¶¸
.
We show that at the optimal auditing policy, α(λ1)λ1 <
α(λ2)
λ2 . Suppose it is not the case,
i.e., α(λ1)λ1 ≥
α(λ2)
λ2 . Since h(x) is increasing then h
³
α(λ1)
λ1
´
≥ h
³
α(λ2)
λ2
´
, both numbers
being negative. Therefore, − 1λ1h
³
α1
λ1
´
+ 1λ2h
³
α2
λ2
´
< 0, which implies that total emissions
decrease after the reallocation of the budget.
(a) Take two firms, with λ1 > λ2. If α(λ1) > 0, then either α(λ2) = t[θ0(e∗λ2)+t]
or, by the
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previous argument, α(λ1)λ1 <
α(λ2)
λ2 . Therefore, α(λ2) > 0. Hence, it exists a λb (B) such
that α(λ) = 0 for all λ > λb (B).
(b) Consider those firms with λ < λ (B) . When the optimal auditing policy lies at the
corner at a certain region of the parameter, α(λ) = t
[θ0(e∗λ)+t]
, then eo(λ) = e∗λ in this
region, which is an increasing function of λ. When the solution is interior, we know that
α(λ1)
λ1 <
α(λ2)
λ2 when λ1 > λ2. We claim that this implies that e
o(λ1) > e
o(λ2). Indeed,
condition (4) for ρ = 1 (that is the relevant condition in region (b)) can be rewritten as:
g0(eo)− α
λ
t− α
λ
θ0(eo) = 0.
Hence, the emission eo is an increasing function of α/λ.
Proof of Proposition 7. First, we note that the agency can propose an equivalent
audit policy to α(z), where it audits with probability 1 any report different from zo, and
with probability α(zo) the report zo. Facing this policy, it is easy to check that the firm
will still decide to report zo: its expected profits by reporting zo do not change, while the
profits in case it chooses any other report are at most the same as before. Hence the two
policies involve the same final emission level and the same cost (i.e., same probability of
auditing). Therefore, for the proof we can restrict attention to the set of audit functions
parametrized by (αo, zo), where αo is the probability with which the firm is audited when
it reports zo, any other report is audited with certainty. Moreover, the policy must be
such that the firm does choose zo.
Given the policy (αo, zo), the optimal emission level e(zo) by the firm is determined
by condition (2), for z = zo and α = αo:
λg0(e(zo))− ραot− ραθ0(e(zo)− zo) = 0.
We can check that e(zo) is a decreasing function. Therefore, the best policy that the
agency can possibly implement in order to minimize the level of emissions with a budget
(probability) αo involves zo = 0 and eo = e(zo = 0) implicitly defined by:
λg0(eo)− ραot− ραθ0(eo) = 0. (7)
The firm will indeed choose zo = 0 if its profits are higher than its other options. Given
that the other reports are audited with probability 1, the best it can do if it chooses z > 0
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is reporting truthfully and polluting e = e∗λ. Therefore, the policy (α
o, zo = 0) is indeed
implementable if and only if:
Π(αo) ≡ λg(eo)− ραoteo − ραθ(eo) ≥ λg(e∗λ)− te∗λ,
where eo is the function of αo defined in (7). It is easy to check that Π(αo) is decreasing
in αo (also taking into account the, null, effect through eo), and that Π(0) is larger and
Π(1) smaller than λg(e∗λ) − te∗λ. Finally, Π(αˆ(ρ, λ)) > λg(e∗λ) − te∗λ. Therefore, the best
policy that the agency can implement with a budget α ≤ αˆ(ρ, λ) leads the firm to report
z = 0 and it is equivalent to the policy where the agency audits any report with the same
probability α.
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Figure 1: Firm’s best decision in terms of the emission level and the report.
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Figure 2: Optimal audit policy and induced level of emissions as a function of ρ.
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